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Introduction
Domestic violence is a common and widespread issue. Out of every three women in the world, one has suffered violence from a partner at some time in her life (WHO, 2013) .
The incidence is more frequent in developing countries. A report, based on data from the Demographic and Health Surveys in nine developing countries (Cambodia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Haiti, India, Nicaragua, Peru, and Zambia) , indicates that the percentage of women who have experienced violence from an intimate partner ranged between 18 percent in Cambodia and 48 percent in Zambia (Kishor and Johnson, 2004) .
In this paper, we explore the causes of domestic violence, using data from Uruguay. A recent survey from Uruguay's Ministry of Public Health reveals that one out of four women falls victim to domestic violence. The survey also indicates that the incidence of domestic violence is higher for those women with low educational attainment.
In this study, we identify the effects of Uruguay's major depreciation of the real exchange rate between 2002 and 2003 . 1 We include an examination of the consequences of an equally significant appreciation of the real exchange rate between 2004 and 2010. As this is a measure of the relative price between tradable and nontradable goods, the fact that men are traditionally employed in tradable industries (e.g., manufacturing) and women in nontradable industries (e.g., services) will be taken into account.
We examine the exogenous variations in the gender wage gap due to these fluctuations to estimate the impact that better alternative options may have on women with regard to domestic violence. By using the variables in the proportion of women vis-á-vis men in the tradable and nontradable sectors across the jurisdictions of Montevideo, Uruguay's capital (with a population of 1.5 million), we find that reduction in potential wages for women relative to men leads to increased incidences of domestic violence.
This result holds true in not only the poor jurisdictions of Montevideo, but also in the rich areas.
There are two alternative theories on which the debate continues and to which this study contributes. On the one hand, socio-cultural models predict that violence against women increases as their wages increase, mainly because men perceive that their traditional gender role is threatened: "when she brings home the bacon" (Macmillan and Gartner, 1999) . On the other hand, models of household bargaining estimate that an increase in a woman's relative potential wage will raise her bargaining power by providing her with better options (Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997; Aizer, 2010) . Given that it is not the actual wage but rather the potential wage that determines another alternative, improving the relative labor market conditions for women will help to decrease such violence, especially in those households where the woman does not work outside the home (Pollak, 2005) . The opposite holds true; that is, the deterioration in women's potential wages relative to men's will increase domestic violence.
Most empirical studies (Gelles, 1976; Tauchen, Witte, and Long, 1991; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997; Bowlus and Seitz, 2006; ) 
Empirical Strategy
Our estimates of domestic violence in Uruguay represent a period when the potential gender wage gap suffered as a result of significant exchange rate variations.
Specifically, these variations⎯as a measure of the relative price between tradable goods (male-work intensive) and nontradable goods (female-work intensive)⎯will be examined.
This approach accounts for the theory that potential wages⎯not actual⎯contribute to domestic violence.
Uruguayan Law defines domestic violence in a similar way to that of the U.S.
Department of Justice. This paper, therefore, will consider domestic violence as a pattern of abusive behavior in a relationship, used by one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another. Domestic violence can be physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological, in action and in threat, borne by a partner in the home.
There are various definitions of real exchange rate in the literature (Hinkle and Montiel, 1999) . First, real exchange rate can be defined as the relationship between domestic and external prices (trade-weighted multilateral), expressed in the same currency (RXR 1 = (E.P*)/P, where E is the nominal exchange rate measured in domestic currency per foreign currency; P* is the level of external prices; and P is the level of domestic prices). More importantly⎯for the purpose of this paper⎯real exchange rate can also be equivalent to a price ratio of different categories of goods within the domestic economy: tradable goods and services and nontradable goods and services.
Tradable goods and services are subject to international trade, in which case arbitrage can determine whether or not the domestic price is equal to the international price. This does not hold true for nontradable goods and services, however, where the price must be adjusted to close the excess of demand or supply in the domestic market. The real exchange rate, therefore, is alternatively defined as follows: RXR 2 = P T /P N , where P T refers to the tradable price and P N for the nontradable price. It is straightforward to show that both definitions, RXR 1 and RXR 2, are closely related. 3 Therefore, changes in the multilateral trade-weighted real exchange rate come hand in hand with changes in the relative prices of tradable and nontradable goods.
Data from Uruguay's National Household Survey confirms that men's wages, relative to women's, move with the real exchange rate. In fact, between 2002 and 2004,
(1-! ) where P is a geometric price average, D is the tradable goods price deviation with respect to the external prices expressed in the same currency, and ! is the share of the tradable goods in the domestic prices basket. after a significant real exchange rate depreciation, the ratio of men's wages to women's in Montevideo increased from 1.52 to 1.58; and between 2004 and 2010, following a real exchange rate appreciation (similar in absolute values to the previous depreciation), the wage ratio dropped back to 1.52. -Fuller Test (MacKinnon, 1996) rejects the null hypothesis that the time series on domestic violence and assault have a unit root. To deal with potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, Newey-West robust standard errors are computed with a lag truncation of four months. All results mentioned, but not shown, are available from the authors upon request. 6 There is no regular survey available on domestic violence victimization.
established that the share of women in the population is very similar across jurisdictions and years. We found that the average share of women was 54 percent, ranging from a maximum of 57 percent to a minimum of 48 percent. Industries were sorted as tradable or nontradable. We applied the International Standard Industrial Classification (Rev.3) to define (i) agriculture, hunting, and forestry, b) fishing, (ii) mining and quarrying, and (iii) manufacturing as tradable industries. The remaining industries were considered as nontradable. This classification is in line with Stockman and Tesar (1995) and Aboal, Lorenzo, and Osimani (2005) . Table 2 To identify the effect of a potential gender wage gap on domestic violence, we apply the variability in the relative proportion of men to women working in the tradable sector in each police jurisdiction. We assumed that those people who are unemployed (including those who have opted not to work) have the same distribution of tradable and nontradable skills as those who are employed. As a result, the potential impact of better options in the job market on unemployed people is recognized. In order to identify the causal effect, a difference-in-difference methodology was followed, controlling for observable and unobservable characteristics that remain constant in time, as well as for shocks that are common in all jurisdictions. For this, the following equation was run: ! is the multilateral exchange rate, ! is a month fixed effect, ! is a jurisdiction fixed effect, and !" is the usual error term. In this equation, the parameter of interest is .
The hypothesis is that an increase in the exchange rate should have a stronger effect on domestic violence in those jurisdictions where the relative proportion of men to women in tradable sectors is higher. That is, we expect > 0. Table 3 represents the estimates of Equation (1). In line with the hypothesis, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, even after considering standard errors clustered at the jurisdiction level (column (1)). That is, an increase in the exchange rate has a stronger effect on domestic violence in those jurisdictions where the relative proportion of men to women in tradable sectors is higher.
Results
Indeed, the coefficient is not only statistically significant; it is also quantitatively substantial. An increase of one standard deviation in the real exchange rate is associated with an increase of 2.7 cases of domestic violence (evaluated at the sample mean of the ratio of men to female participation in the tradable sectors). This increase in the number of cases of domestic violence is important, since it represents more than a third of the sample mean (7.39). Separate analyses were made of the impact on rich and poor jurisdictions of the city and similar results were evidenced (columns (2) and (3)).
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The results hold true subsequent to the controlling by the per capita income of the jurisdictions (column (4)).This discards alternative interpretations that connect the variation in domestic violence to fluctuations in the aggregate level of income of the household in place of the change in women's bargaining power.
The results also hold when we took into account the number of cases of domestic violence normalized by the population of the jurisdictions (column (5)). This also applies when we used annual data in lieu of monthly data, with and without controlling for the per capita income of jurisdictions (columns (6) and (7)). Additionally, we ran a false experiment with regard to the variation in assaults, a similar type of offense but occurring outside the home. That is, Equation (1) was applied, using assaults as an outcome rather than related to domestic violence. As shown in Table 4 , the coefficient on the interaction term is not significant in all specifications (columns (1), (2), and (3)). These results provide additional evidence that the effect on domestic violence is, indeed, causal.
Conclusions
For this paper, we delved further into the economic causes of domestic violence, whereby the relationship between income and domestic violence is examined. We expanded the coverage of the definition of domestic violence (including any type of nonphysical abuse) in previous findings in the literature. We found that a reduction in women's potential wages, relative to men's, increased domestic violence, whereas an increase in women's relative potential wages decreased men's incentive towards aggression within the home. The result also holds for the rich and poor jurisdictions of the city, suggesting that the effect cuts across the various levels of income.
Our paper⎯as do most papers in this literature⎯uses data on reported crime instead of actual crime. In principle, it is possible that reporting is not orthogonal to the changes in the exchange rate, potentially biasing the estimates. This bias, however, could go in either direction. For example, the appreciation of the real exchange rate may 8 A rich jurisdiction is defined as one where the average per capita income is above the 66 th percentile of the per capita income of the city in the first year of the sample. A poor jurisdiction is defined as one where the average per capita income is below the 33 rd percentile of the per capita income of the city in the first year of the sample. 9 Results also hold when a regression model is used to count data (Poisson or negative binomial).
decrease the reporting if women feel responsible for the worsening of men's economic conditions. Alternatively, the availability of better options may increase the propensity of women to report domestic violence.
Our findings contribute to the ongoing global debate on the causal effect of the gender wage gap and domestic violence. Evidence is presented in line with the hypothesis that an increase in the bargaining power of women, relative to men, within the household reduces domestic violence. Therefore, government policies that aim to reduce the gender wage gap will impact positively on domestic violence. Simultaneously, these results suggest that the intensity of women-oriented policies should be calibrated according to the fluctuations in the real exchange rate. In fact, macro literature has long recognized the potential economic advantages of real exchange depreciations, produced by the competitive gains of exporters. Here, we unmask a potential social issue that is associated with real exchange depreciation⎯that of rising domestic violence. Notes: RXR refers to real exchange rate. Ratio refers to the ratio of men to female participation in tradable sectors. A rich jurisdiction is one where the average per capita income is above the 66 th percentile of the per capita income of the city in the first year of the sample. A poor jurisdiction is one where the average per capita income is below the 33 rd percentile of the per capita income of the city in the first year of the sample. All models are estimated by OLS. Models (1) to (5) use monthly data and include month fixed effects and jurisdiction fixed effects. Model (6) and (7) use yearly data and include year fixed effects and jurisdiction fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the jurisdiction level are in brackets; p refers to the p-value of each test. 
